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Simon’s and Theil’s certainty equivalence property justiﬁes a conve-
nient algorithm for solving dynamic programming problems with quadratic
objectives and linear transition laws: ﬁrst, optimize under perfect foresight,
then substitute optimal forecasts for unknown future values. A similar de-
composition into separate optimization and forecasting steps prevails when
a decision maker wants a decision rule that is robust to model misspeciﬁ-
cation. Concerns about model misspeciﬁcation leave the ﬁrst step of the
algorithm intact and aﬀect only the second step of forecasting the future.
The decision maker attains robustness by making forecasts with a distorted
model that twists probabilities relative to his approximating model. The
appropriate twisting emerges from a two-player zero-sum dynamic game.
Note: This paper was prepared for a conference at the Federal Reserve Board on March
26–27, 2004 to honor the work of our friends Dale Henderson, Richard Porter, and Peter
Tinsley. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference to honor the memory
of Henri Theil.2
1. Certainty equivalence and rational expectations
Lucas and Sargent (1981) attributed to Simon’s (1956) and Theil’s (1957) certainty equiv-
alence principle an important role in developing applied dynamic rational expectations
models. Two of the three examples in Lucas’s Critique (1976) and all but one of the pa-
pers in Lucas and Sargent (1981) assumed environments for which certainty equivalence
prevails. By sharply delineating the two steps of (1) optimizing for a given set of expec-
tations and (2) forming expectations optimally, certainty equivalent problems formed a
perfect environment for extracting the methodological and econometric lessons of rational
expectations.1 Two of the most important of these were : (a) how rational expectations
imposes a set of cross-equation restrictions that link the parameters of an optimal decision
rule to laws of motion for variable that inﬂuence a decision maker’s payoﬀs (e.g., prices),
but that are beyond his control;2 and (b) how the concept of Granger-causality, based
as it is on a prediction-error criterion, can guide the empirical speciﬁcation of variables
that belong on the right side of decision rule because they help predict those inﬂuential
variables. Environments for which certainty equivalence holds are ones for which it is
easiest to compute decision rules analytically. That has facilitated formal analysis as well
as numerical computation.3 Finally, for some important applications, certainty equivalent
environments are benchmarks against which departures have been measured.4
1 The literatures on applied dynamic economics and macroeconomics before Muth were almost ideally
set up for application of the certainty equivalence principle. The standard practice then was to apply
nonstochastic optimization problems, then to supplement the solution with a theory about expectations.
2 This is the Lucas critique.
3 Many papers in the real business cycle literature have approximated the solutions to optimization
problems for which certainty equivalence does not obtain with related problems in which it does.
4 A leading example occurs in the precautionary savings literature, which by perturbing a linear quadratic
benchmark alters the pure ‘permanent income’ model of consumption to induce an extra source of saving
from the extra curvature of the marginal utility of consumption.3
2. Model uncertainty
As in a rational expectations model or the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game, the
decision maker envisioned in Simon’s and Theil’s analysis experiences no uncertainty about
the speciﬁcation of his dynamic model. He knows the model up to the realization of a
Gaussian random disturbance. But in practice a decision maker could ﬁnd himself knowing
less, like econometricians whose ﬁnite data sets expose them to doubts provoked by their
statistical speciﬁcation tests.
Diverse literatures on ‘uncertainty aversion’ and ‘robustness’ consider decision makers
who do not ‘know the model’. They make decisions knowing at best a set of models. Such
agents are inspired either by the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or their desire
for a decision rule that is robust to misspeciﬁed model dynamics (e.g., Zhou, Glover, and
Doyle (1996)) to choose a decision rule from a systematic worst-model analysis of alterna-
tive rules. These literatures represent model uncertainty by having a decision maker retain
a set of models that he refuses to reduce to one by the Bayesian device of assigning proba-
bilities over models in the set. This non-Bayesian decision maker behaves as someone who
maximizes expected utility while assuming that, given his decision rule, a perverse nature
chooses the worst from within his set of models. The literature on robustness shows how
such min-max behavior promotes a decision rule that is robust to model misspeciﬁcation.
The ignorance that is called uncertainty in these literatures on uncertainty aversion
and robustness is evidently worse than not knowing realizations from a known probability
distribution, the subject of Simon’s and Theil’s certainty equivalence. Nevertheless, a
remarkable and useful version of certainty equivalence prevails when a decision maker
expresses his fear of model misspeciﬁcation by wanting good decisions across a set of models
near his approximating model.5 The structure of this modiﬁed certainty equivalence result
parallels that for ordinary certainty equivalence. It too sharply divides decision making
into separate phases of ﬁrst optimizing given beliefs, then forming beliefs. The ﬁrst stage
turns out to be identical to that for Simon’s and Theil’s setting. But in the second stage,
the decision maker purposively distorts beliefs relative to his approximating model in order
to achieve robustness. The resulting form of certainty equivalence preserves many of the
5 This insight began with Jacobson (1973) and was also developed by Whittle (1982, 1999), Ba¸ sar and
Bernard (1995), and Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2004).4
analytical conveniences of Simon’s and Theil’s result. It also sheds light on the kind
of precaution that is induced by a concern about model misspeciﬁcation. In addition,
it provides underpinnings for a Bayesian rationalization of the decision made by a robust
decision maker. The certainty equivalence representation exposes a distorted law of motion
in terms of which the robust decision maker behaves as though he were a Bayesian.
3. Ordinary certainty equivalence
3.1. Notation and setup
For any vector y, let ys
t denote the history from t to s. If a subscript is omitted, we take it
to be zero. If a superscript is omitted, we take it to be +∞. Thus, yt is the history from
0 to t, and yt is the future from t to +∞.






zt+1 = f (zt,t+1) (3.1)
where t+1 is an i.i.d. sequence of random vectors with cumulative distribution function
Φ. The endogenous component xt is partially inﬂuenced by the decision maker’s control
ut and has a transition law
xt+1 = g (xt,zt,ut). (3.2)









where β ∈ (0,1), E(·)|yt is the mathematical expectation conditioned on yt ≡ (xt,zt),
and ut is required to be a measurable function of yt. The decision maker chooses ut to
maximize (3.3) subject to (3.1) and (3.2). The solution is a decision rule
ut = h(xt,zt). (3.4)
Along with Simon (1956) and Theil (1957), throughout this paper we use
Assumption 1: The one-period return function r is quadratic, e.g., r(y,u) = −y0Qy −
u0Ru where Q,R are both positive semideﬁnite matrices; f and g are both linear; and Φ
is multivariate Gaussian with mean zero and identity covariance matrix.5
Simon and Theil showed that under Assumption 1 the solution of the stochastic opti-
mization problem of maximizing (3.3) subject to (3.2) and (3.1) has a special structure. In
particular, the problem can be separated into two parts (notice that only (3.3) and (3.2)
appear in part 1, while only (3.1) is used in part 2):
1. Solve the nonstochastic or perfect-foresight problem of maximizing (3.3) subject to
(3.2), assuming that the future sequence zt is known. This leads to a ‘feedback-
feedforward solution’
ut = h1 (xt,zt). (3.5)
The decision for ut feeds back on the endogenous state vector xt and feeds forward
on the future of the exogenous component of the state vector zt. The function h1 can
be computed from knowing only V and g, and without knowing f. In particular, h1
is obtained by deducing the decision maker’s Euler equation for ut, then solving it
forward. The parts of assumption A1 stating that V is quadratic and g is linear make
h1 a linear function.
2. Using the function f and the c.d.f. Φ in (3.1), compute the mathematical expectation
of zt conditioned on the history zt. By iterating on (3.1) when f is linear, the future
sequence zt can be expressed as a linear function of an initial condition, zt, and the
sequence of future shocks:
zt = h2 · zt + h3 · ∞
t+1. (3.6)
Then from the assumed properties of the i.i.d. sequence {t+1}, the solution of the
forecasting problem takes the form
Ezt|zt = h2 · zt. (3.7)
The certainty equivalence or separation principle states that the optimal decision rule
in pure feedback form can be obtained by replacing zt in (3.5) with Ezt|zt from (3.7):
ut = h1 (xt,h2 · zt) = h(xt,zt) (3.8)
Each of h1,h2, and h are linear functions. The decision rule (3.8) feeds back on both
exogenous and endogenous components of the state.6
The original stochastic control problem thus separates into a nonstochastic control
problem and a statistical estimation problem. An inspiration for the term ‘certainty equiv-
alence’ is that the control problem in step (1) can be solved by assuming that the future
sequence of z’s, zt, is known.










The optimized value of (3.3) starting from state y0 is given by a value function
V (y0) = −y0
0Py0 − p. (3.10)
The constant p depends on the ‘volatility statistics’ h3h0
3 in (3.9), but the matrix P in
the quadratic form in (3.10) does not. In particular, the matrix P is the ﬁxed point of an
operator
T (P) = T (P;r,g,f1), (3.11)
where we express the linear law of motion for zt as zt+1 = f1zt + f2t+1. The volatility
parameters f2 do not appear in T. The constant p does depend on f2 via the operator
p = p(P;f2,β). (3.12)
Note that the ﬁxed point P = T(P) can be solved ﬁrst, then the solution can be put into
(3.12) to ﬁnd p.
This last observation leads to another manifestation of the certainty equivalence prin-
ciple, which comes from noting that the optimal decision rule (3.8) for the stochastic




subject to (3.2) and the nonstochastic law of motion
zt+1 = f (zt,0). (3.14)7
Equation (3.14) sets all of the shocks impinging on the state to their unconditional means
of zero. For this problem, the optimal value function becomes
V (y0) = −y0
0Py0, (3.15)
which diﬀers from (3.10) only by the absence of the constant p. The decision rule depends
only on the quadratic forms in the continuation value functions (3.10) and (3.10), not on
the constants. Therefore, the presence of uncertainty in the original problem lowers the
value of the problem by lowering p, but does not aﬀect the decision rule. The decision
maker prefers less uncertainty to more, i.e., he prefers a f2 and therefore a smaller h3
loading in (3.6), but does not allow his decisions to respond to diﬀerent values of h3.
4. Model misspeciﬁcation and robustness
We now turn to a type of certainty equivalence that prevails when the decision maker does
not trust his model of the dynamics for zt. This certainty equivalence principle lets the
decision maker use the type of two-step optimization process described above. His doubts
about the transition law are expressed in the way he forms expectations in the second step.
The decision maker believes that (3.1) might be misspeciﬁed because the data are
actually generated by the law of motion
zt+1 = f (zt,t+1 + wt+1) (4.1)
where wt+1 is a process whose time t + 1 component is a measurable function ωt of the





The decision maker thinks that his model (3.1) is a good approximation to the data







  y0 ≤ η0
#
(4.2)
where η0 measures the size of the maximal speciﬁcation error and the expectation operator
ˆ E is evaluated with respect the distribution generated by (4.1).6
6 See AHS and HS (200XXX) for a reasonable way to measure discrepancies between models.8
To construct a robust decision rule, the decision maker computes the Markov perfect















where the components of ut,wt+1 must each be measurable functions of the time t histories
yt. In the Markov perfect equilibrium, the timing protocol is that each player chooses
sequentially and simultaneously each period, taking the other player’s decision rule as
given. Note how the worst case shock mean distortions wt+1 feedback on the endogenous
state vector xt. Allowing this feedback is part of the way that the maximizing agent designs
a rule that is robust to the possibility that the dynamics of (3.1) are misspeciﬁed.
A robust rule is generated by the u component of a Markov perfect equilibrium of
game (4.3):
ut = h(xt,zt) (4.4a)
wt+1 = W (xt,zt). (4.4b)
The rule is robust in the sense that it promises a lower maximal rate at which the objective
ˆ E[
P∞
t=0 βtr(yt,ut)]|y0 can deteriorate with increases in misspeciﬁcation as measured by the
terms w0
t+1wt+1.
4.1. Stackelberg equilibrium and certainty equivalence
The Markov perfect equilibrium conceals that a form of certainty equivalence prevails
despite the decision maker’s uncertainty about his approximating model. To reveal the
certainty equivalence within the robust decision rule (4.4b), it helps to formulate another
game with the same players and payoﬀs, but a diﬀerent timing protocol. Remarkably, this
change in timing protocol leaves intact both the equilibrium outcome and its recursive
representation (4.4), a consequence of the special zero-sum feature of the dynamic game
(see Ba¸ sar and Bernhard (1995) and Hansen and Sargent (200XX)).
We now impose the following timing protocol on a two-player zero-sum game with
transition laws (3.2), (4.1) and the payoﬀ (4.3). At time 0, the minimizing player once-
and-for-all chooses a plan w1, where wt+1 is a measurable function of information known to
him at time t, which we denote Yt. Given the random sequence w1, the maximizing player9
chooses ut each period. This timing protocol makes the minimizing player the Stackelberg
leader. At time 0, the minimizing player chooses w1, taking into account the best response
of the maximizing player, who chooses sequentially and regards {wt+1} as an exogenous
process.
4.2. Representing the Stackelberg timing protocol
To reﬂect the Stackelberg timing protocol, we add state variables to describe the decisions
to which the minimizing player commits at time 0. We use upper case counterparts of
xt and zt to denote these additional state variables, all of which the maximizing player
takes as exogenous. Each of the vectors X,Y,Z has the same dimension as its lower case
counterpart. At time 0, the Stackelberg leader makes wt+1 follow the law of motion:
wt+1 = W (Xt,Zt) (4.5a)
Xt+1 = g (Xt,Zt,h(Xt,Zt)) (4.5b)
Zt+1 = f (Zt,W (Xt,Zt) + t+1) (4.5c)
which we summarize as
wt+1 = W (Yt) (4.6a)
Yt+1 = MYt + Nt+1. (4.6b)
Note the appearance in (4.5b) of the maximizing player’s best response function h(X,Z)
from (4.4b). Also W in (4.5a) is the same best response function that appears in (4.4b).
Thus, equations (4.5b) and (4.5c) are the ‘big letter’ counterparts to (4.1) and (3.2), where
we have substituted ‘big letter’ analogues of the best response functions (4.4) for the big
letter counterparts to ut and wt+1.
The maximizing agent takes (4.6) as given and forecasts zt according to the distorted
law of motion (4.1), (4.6), where the role of the latter system of equations is to describe
the distortion process wt+1. Thus, given the time 0 choice of the minimizing player, the
maximizing player assumes the law of model for zt to be
Yt+1 = MYt + Nt+1 (4.7a)
wt+1 = W (Yt) (4.7b)
zt+1 = f (zt,t+1 + wt+1). (4.7c)10
The maximizing player faces an ordinary dynamic programming problem of maximizing
(3.3) subject to (3.2) and (4.7), and so chooses a decision rule of the form
ut = ˜ H (xt,zt,Yt). (4.8)
Under the Stackelberg timing protocol, we use the following
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium is a collection of functions h,W, ˜ H such that: (a) Given ˜ H,
the decision rule (4.6) solves the minimizing player’s problem; (b) Given (4.6), decision rule
(4.8) solves the maximizing player’s problem; (c) ˜ H(Xt,Zt,Yt) = h(Xt,Yt); (d) Y0 = y0.
Conditions (c) and (d) impose versions of what in macroeconomics are called the ‘big K
equals little k’ conditions.
Ba¸ sar and Bernhard (1995) and Hansen and Sargent (2004) prove that
˜ H (Xt,Zt,Yt) = h(Yt). (4.9)
This result asserts that the same decision rule for ut emerges from the Markov perfect and
the Stackelberg games. It rationalizes an interpretation of robust decision rule h(Yt) in
terms of a modiﬁed type of certainty equivalence.
4.3. Stackelberg and certainty equivalence
The Stackelberg timing protocol allows us to characterize the maximizing player’s choice
with an Euler equation that we can solve forward to get his time t decision as a function
of future actions of the minimizing player. This legitimizes the following two-step solution
procedure.
1. Solve the same non-stochastic problem as in step (1) above, assuming again that the
sequence zt is known, leading to the same solution (3.5):
ut = h1 (xt,zt).
2. Using the distorted law of motion (4.7), compute the mathematical expectation of zt
conditioned on the history zt. The Markov property of (4.7), the linearity of f, and
the Gaussian distribution of ∞
t+1 make the solution of this forecasting problem take
the form






where ˆ E denotes the conditional expectation using model (4.7).
A modiﬁed separation principle states that the robust decision rule in pure feedback
form can be obtained by replacing zt in (3.5) with ˆ E[zt|zt,Yt] from (4.10), and then setting
Yt = yt.7 This yields the robust decision rule
ut = h1

xt,ˆ h2 · yt

. (4.11)
It occurs that (4.11) is equivalent with the robust rule (4.4a), the u component of the
Markov perfect equilibrium of game (4.3), so that ut = h1(xt,ˆ h2 · yt) = h(xt,zt).
Another view of this certainty equivalence result come from noting that there is a
counterpart to our ﬁnding without robustness that the same decision rule (but a diﬀerent
optimal value function) emerges had we just set {t}∞
t=1 to zero. That is, the same decision
rule h(xt,zt) would emerge from our Stackelberg problem had we solved the nonstochastic
control problem that emerges upon replacing (4.7) with the nonstochastic law of motion
Yt+1 = MYt
wt+1 = W (Yt)
zt+1 = f (zt,wt+1),
which we form by setting t+1 ≡ 0 in (4.7).
5. Other uses of the Stackelberg timing protocol
The ‘big letter’ law of motion associated with the Stackelberg timing protocol has other
important uses in addition to clarifying the certainty equivalence embedded in the robust
decision rule. These include:
• Supporting a recursive representation of state-contingent prices for a decentral-
ized version of an economy with a robust representative agent. These prices
can be expressed as linear functions of a state Yt that is described by a version
of (4.5). See AHS (200XXX) and Hansen and Sargent (2000XXX) for details.
• Supplying a Bayesian interpretation of a robust decision maker. Equation
(4.7) provides a unique model or belief that rationalizes the robust decision
maker’s choices. See Blackwell and Girshik (19XXX) for related material about
interpreting the outcomes of zero sum games.
7 This is the stage at which we set ‘big K’ equal to ‘little k’.12
6. Certainty equivalence and the value function
Under a preference for robustness, the optimized value of (4.3) starting from state y0 is
given by a value function
V (y0) = −y0
0Py0 − p (6.1)
but now the constant p and the matrix P both depend on the volatility parameters f2 in
the representation
zt+1 = f1zt + f2 (t+1 + wt+1). (6.2)
In particular, the matrix P is now the ﬁxed point of a composite operator T ◦ D where T
is the same operator deﬁned in (3.11) and D is an operator
D(P) = D(P;f2,θ), (6.3)
that depends on f2 and θ. Given a ﬁxed point P of T ◦ D, p is then a function
p = p(P;f2,β,θ). (6.4)
The D operator represents the distortion through w imposed by the minimizing player,
while the T operator represents the maximizing player’s choice of u. Because P is a ﬁxed
point of T ◦D, the volatility parameters f2 now inﬂuence P and therefore the decision rule
h. Nevertheless, a form of certain equivalence prevails.
Thus, paralleling our earlier discussion without robustness, another manifestation of
the certainty equivalence principle under robustness comes from noting that identical de-
cision rules (4.4) also emerge from the nonstochastic game associated with extremizing
(i.e., jointly minimizing and maximizing) (4.3) subject to (3.2) and the nonstochastic law
of motion
zt+1 = f (zt,wt+1) = f1zt + f2wt+1. (6.5)
Equation (6.5) sets all of the shocks impinging on the state to their unconditional means
of wt+1. For this problem, the equilibrium value function becomes
V (y0) = −y0
0Py0, (6.6)
which diﬀers from (6.1) only by the absence of the constant p. The decision rule depends
only on the quadratic forms in the continuation value functions (3.10) and (3.10), not on13
the constants. Therefore, the presence of randomness lowers the value of the game by
lowering p, but does not aﬀect the decision rule.
7. Risk sensitive preferences
Building on results of Jacobson (1973) and Whittle (1990), Hansen and Sargent (1995)
showed that another way to interpret the decision rules that we obtain under a preference
for robustness is to regard them as reﬂecting a particular version of Epstein and Zin’s
(1989) speciﬁcation of recursive preferences. Thus, suppose now that the decision maker
believes his model and so has no concern about model misspeciﬁcation. Let the model be
yt+1 = Ayt + But + Ct+1 (7.1)
where t+1 is an i.i.d. Gaussian process with contemporaneous mean zero and identity co-
variance matrix. Hansen and Sargent suppose that the decision maker evaluates processes
{yt,ut}∞
t=0 according to a utility function U0 that is deﬁned by the ﬁxed point of recursions
on
















and σ ≤ 0 is the risk sensitivity parameter. When σ = 0, an application of l’hospital’s rule
shows that the right side of (7.2) becomes r(yt,ut) + βEUt+1|yt. However, when σ < 0,
Rt departs from the ordinary conditional expectation operator. It puts an additional
correction for risk into the evaluation of continuation utility Ut+1. The risk-sensitive control
problem is to choose a decision rule ut = −Fxt that maximizes U0 deﬁned by recursions
on (7.2), subject to (7.1).
Despite their diﬀerent motivations, a risk-sensitive control problem yields precisely
the same decision rule as a corresponding robust control problem with θ = −σ−1. This
useful fact can be established by following Jacobson (1973) and evaluating Rt(Ue
t+1) for a
candidate quadratic continuation value function
Ue
t+1 = −y0
t+1Ωyt+1 − ρ (7.4)14
and a time t decision rule ut = −Ftxt, so that (7.1) becomes
yt+1 = ˆ Atyt + Ct+1 (7.5)
where ˆ At = A − BFt. Using the properties of the Gaussian distribution, one obtains
RtUe
t+1 = −yt ˆ A0
tD(Ω) ˆ Atyt − ˆ ρ, (7.6)
where D is the same operator deﬁned in (6.3) with θ = −σ−1 and8





If we guess that the value function is quadratic, the Bellman equation for a risk-sensitive
control problem is9








where the maximization is subject to y∗ = Ay + Bu + C. It follows that P is the ﬁxed
point of iterations on T ◦ D, where T is the operator deﬁned in (3.11) that is associated
with the ordinary quadratic intertermporal optimization problem without risk-sensitivity
and without a preference for robustness. Since the matrices in the quadratic forms in the
value functions are the same, both being ﬁxed points of T ◦D, the decision rule for ut is the
same under risk sensitivity or a preference for robustness. Under risk-sensitive preferences,
the D operator comes from evaluating the R operator, while the T operator comes one-
step on the ordinary Bellman equation, taking Rt(−y∗0Py∗ − p) as the continuation value
function.
It immediately follows from these results that with quadratic r(y,u), a form of certainty








In the shorthand notation used in (6.3), f2 is playing the role of C.
9 The P that solves (7.7) matches the P in the value function (6.1) for the robust control problem, but
the constants p diﬀer. The decision rules depend on P but not on the constants.15
8. Example: robustness and discounting in a permanent income model
This section illustrates certainty equivalence in the context of a linear-quadratic version of
a simple permanent income model.10 In the basic permanent income model, a consumer
applies a single marginal propensity to consume to the sum of his ﬁnancial wealth and his
‘human wealth’, deﬁned as the expected present value of his labor (or endowment) income
discounted at the same risk-free rate of return that he earns on his ﬁnancial assets. In the
usual permanent income model without a preference for robustness, the consumer has no
doubts about the probability model used to form the conditional expectation of discounted
future labor income. But with a preference for robustness, the consumer doubts that model
and therefore forms forecasts of future income by using a probability distribution that is
twisted or slanted relative to his approximating model for his endowment process. Except
for this slanting, the consumer behaves as an ordinary permanent income consumer, i.e.,
uses the same component function h1 from (3.5), a reﬂection of our certainty equivalence
principle under robustness.
This slanting of probabilities leads the consumer to engage in a form of precautionary
savings that under the approximating model tilts his consumption proﬁle toward the fu-
ture relative to what it would be without a preference for robustness. Indeed, so far as
his consumption and saving program is concerned, activating a preference for robustness
is equivalent with making the consumer more patient. However, that is not the end of
the story because elsewhere (HST and HSW) we have shown that attributing a prefer-
ence for robustness to a representative consumer has diﬀerent eﬀects on asset prices than
does varying his discount factor, even though it can leave a consumption-savings program
unaltered.
10 See Sargent (1987) and Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) for accounts of the connection between
the permanent income consumer and Barro’s (1979) model of tax smoothing. See Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2003) for a more extensive exploration of the connections.16
8.1. The LQ permanent income model
In the linear-quadratic permanent income model (e.g., Hall (1978)), a consumer receives
an exogenous endowment process {z2t} and wants to allocate it between consumption ct




βt (ct − z1)
2 ,β ∈ (0,1) (8.1)
where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on time 0 information, and
the constant z1 is a bliss level of consumption. We simplify the problem by assuming that
the endowment process is a ﬁrst-order autoregression. Thus, the household faces the state
transition laws
xt+1 + ct = Rxt + z2t (8.2a)
z2,t+1 = µd (1 − ρ) + ρz2t + cd (t+1 + wt+1), (8.2b)
where R > 1 is a time-invariant gross rate of return on ﬁnancial assets xt held at the
beginning of period t, and |ρ| < 1 describes the persistence of his endowment process.
In (8.2b), wt+1 is a distortion to the mean of the endowment process that represents
possible model misspeciﬁcation. For convenience, we follow Whittle (1990) and use the
risk-sensitivity parameter σ = −θ−1 to measure the consumer’s preference for robustness.
We begin by setting σ = 0 and solving the problem with no preference for robustness, then
activate a preference for robustness by setting σ < 0 (i.e., θ < +∞). It is useful to let the
consumer’s choice variable be µct = z1 − ct, the marginal utility of consumption and to
express (8.2a) as
xt+1 = Rxt + (z2t − z1) + µct. (8.3)17
8.2. Solution when σ = 0
As promised, ﬁrst we solve the household’s problem without a preference for robustness,
so that σ = 0. The household’s Euler equation is
Etµc,t+1 = (βR)
−1 µct. (8.4)
Treating (8.2a) as a diﬀerence equation in xt, solving it forward in time, and taking con-




R−(j+1)Et (ct+j − z2,t+j). (8.5)
This equation imposes expected present value budget balance on the household. Solving








R−j (z2,t+j − z1)

 (8.6)
Note that because µct = z1−ct, this equation is a version of (3.5), i.e., it is the household’s
Euler equation “solved forward”, so that the right side of (8.6) portrays the function h1
after Ezt|zt has replaced zt. Equations (8.4) and (8.6) can be used to deduce the following
representation for µct
µc,t+1 = (βR)
−1 µc,t + νt+1 (8.7)
where ν is a scalar.11
Given an initial condition µc,0, equation (8.7) describes the consumer’s optimal behav-
ior. This initial condition is determined by solving (8.6) at t = 0. Note that it is easy to







which is a particular version of (3.4). In the case βR = 1 that was analyzed by Hall (1978),
(8.7) implies that the marginal utility of consumption µct is a martingale, which because
µct = z1 − ct also implies that consumption is a martingale.
11 See HS for a way to compute ν from the linear regulator.18
8.3. A robust consumption rule σ < 0
Under a preference for robustness, the decision rule for consumption is summarized by the





Rxt + ˆ Et
∞ X
j=0
R−j (z2,t+j − z1)

 (8.9)
where ˆ Et ≡ ˆ E[·|zt,Yt] is the distorted expectations operator associated with the law of
motion chosen by the malevolent agent in a Stackelberg equilibrium with σ < 0. Note how
(8.9) assumes the certainty-equivalent form ut = h1(xt, ˆ Ezt|zt,Yt) that underlies (4.11),
where h1 is the same function that pertains to the no-robustness σ = 0 problem. By
substituting explicit formulas for the forecasts ˆ E[zt|zt,Yt] that appear in (8.9), we obtain
a robust consumption rule in the feedback form (4.11).
To compute the distorted measure with respect to which ˆ E in (8.9) is to be com-



















µc,t + νwt+1. (8.11)
Equation (8.11), the consumption Euler equation of the maximizing player (the household),
encodes the maximizing player’s best response to the minimizing player’s choice. Under
the Stackelberg timing, the minimizing player commits to a sequence {wt+1}∞
t=0 which
the maximizing player takes as given. The minimizing player determines that sequence
by solving (8.10), (8.11). The worst case shock that emerges from this problem can be
portrayed as a feedback rule wt+1 = kµct. Since from (8.8) µct = hyt in the Markov perfect
equilibrium, we can also represent the shock mean distortion as
wt+1 = khyt ≡ Wyt, (8.12)
a version of (4.4b).
The Stackelberg timing protocol confronts the consumer with an exogenous wt+1 se-
quence of the form (4.6). We can use (8.12) in the manner described above to create such19
an exogenous representation for wt+1. The household can then be regarded as solving an
ordinary control problem subject to (8.2), (4.6), and (8.12).
8.4. Eﬀects on consumption of a preference for robustness
To understand the eﬀects on consumption of a preference for robustness, we use as a
benchmark Hall’s case of βR = 1 and no preference for robustness (σ = 0). In that
case, we have seen that µct and consumption are both driftless random walks. To be
concrete, we set the parameters of our example to be consistent with ones calibrated from
post-World War U.S. time series by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) for a more
general permanent income model. They set β = .9971 and ﬁt a two-factor model for the
endowment process where each factor is a second order autoregression. To simplify their
speciﬁcation, we replace their estimated two-factor endowment process with the population
ﬁrst-order autoregression one would obtain if that two factor model actually generated
the data. Thus, ﬁtting the ﬁrst-order autoregressive process (8.2b) with wt+1 ≡ 0 using
the population moments implied by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini’s (HST’s) estimated
endowment process we obtain the endowment process zt+1 = .9992zt + 5.5819t+1 where
t+1 is an i.i.d. scalar process with mean zero and unit variance.12 We use ˆ β to denote
HST’s β = .9971 ≡ ˆ β. Throughout, we suppose that R = ˆ β−1.
We now consider three cases.
• The βR = 1,σ = 0 case studied by Hall (1978). With β = ˆ β ≡ .9971, we
compute that the marginal utility of consumption follows the law of motion
µc,t+1 = µc,t + 4.3825t+1 (8.13)
where we computed the coeﬃcient 4.3825 on t+1 using a formula from Hansen
and Sargent (20XX).
• A version of Hall’s βR = 1 speciﬁcation with a preference for robustness.
Retaining ˆ βR = 1, we activate a preference for robustness by setting σ =
ˆ σ − 2E − 7 < 0. Under the approximating model, we now compute that
µc,t+1 = .9976µc,t + 8.0473t+1. (8.14)
12 We computed ρ,cd by calculating autocovariances implied by HST’s speciﬁcation, then used them to
calculate the implied population ﬁrst-order autoregressive representation.20
When b − ct > 0, this equation implies that Et(b − ct+1) = .9976(b − ct) <
(b−ct) which in turn implies that Etct+1 > ct. Thus, the eﬀect of activating a
preference for robustness is to put upward drift into the consumption proﬁle,
a manifestation of a kind of ‘precautionary savings’.
• A case that raises the discount factor relative to the βR = 1 benchmark prevail-
ing in Hall’s model, but withholds a preference for robustness. In particular,
while we set σ = 0 we increase β to ˜ β = .9995. Remarkably, with (σ,β) = (0, ˜ β),
we compute that µc,t+1 continues to obey exactly (8.14).
The second and third bullets point to an observational equivalence result about oﬀset-
ting changes in σ and β. Thus, starting from (σ,β) = (0, ˆ β), the eﬀect on consumption and
saving of activating a preference for robustness by lowering σ so that σ < 0 while keeping
β constant are evidently equivalent with keeping σ = 0 but increasing the discount factor
to a particular ˜ β > ˆ β.
These numerical examples illustrate what can be conﬁrmed more generally, that in the
permanent income model an increased preference for robustness operates exactly like an
increase in the discount factor β. In particular, let α2 = ν0ν and suppose that instead of
the particular pair (ˆ σ, ˆ β), where (ˆ σ < 0), we use the pair (0, ˜ β), where ˜ β satisﬁes:
˜ β (σ) =
ˆ β







v u u t1 − 4ˆ β
1 + σα2






Then the laws of motion for µc,t, and therefore the decision rules for ct, are identical across
these two preference speciﬁcations. Hansen and Sargent (200XX) establish formula (8.15).21
8.5. Observational equivalence and distorted expectations
8.6. Distorted endowment process
When σ = 0, the consumer faces a law of motion for the state vector yt that we can
represent as
yt+1 = Ayt + Bµct + Ct+1. (8.16)
When σ < 0, the minimizing agent adds Cwt+1 to the right side of this transition law,
where wt+1 = Wyt. Under the Stackelberg timing protocol, the maximizing agent faces an
exogenous {wt+1} process that evolves according to
Yt+1 = (A + Bh + CW)Yt + Ct+1 (8.17a)
wt+1 = WYt (8.17b)
Under the Stackelberg timing protocol, the maximizing player thus faces the following



















If the decision maker solves an ordinary dynamic programming program without a pref-
erence for robustness but substitutes the distorted transition law for the one given by his
approximating model, he attains robust decision rules. Thus, when σ < 0, instead of fac-
ing the transition law (8.16) that prevails under the approximating model, the household
would use the distorted transition law (8.18).
It is useful to consider our observational equivalence result in light of the distorted
law of motion (8.18). Let ˆ Et denote a conditional expectation taken with respect to the
distorted transition law (8.18) for the endowment shock and let Et denote the expectation
taken with respect to the approximating model. Then the observational equivalence of the




1 − R−2ˆ β−1


Rxt−1 + ˆ Et
∞ X
j=0












R−j (zt+j − b)

.22
For both of these expressions to be true, the eﬀect on ˆ E of setting σ less than zero must
be just oﬀset by the eﬀect of raising β from ˆ β to ˜ β.
8.7. Equivalence of quantities but not continuation values
Our numerical examples illustrate that, holding other parameters constant, there exists a
locus of (σ,β) pairs that imply the same consumption, saving programs. Furthermore, it
can be veriﬁed that the P matrices appearing in the quadratic forms in the value function
are identical for the (ˆ σ, ˆ β) and (0, ˜ β) problems. However, in terms of their implications for
pricing claims on risky future payoﬀs, it is signiﬁcant that the D(P) matrices diﬀer across
such (σ,β) pairs. For the (0, ˜ β) pair, P = D(P). However, when σ < 0, D(P) diﬀers from
P. HST show that D(P) encodes the shadow prices that are relevant for pricing uncertain
claims on future consumption. Thus, although the (ˆ σ, ˆ β) and (0, ˜ β) parameter settings
imply identical savings and consumption plans, they imply diﬀerent valuations of risky
future consumption payoﬀs. HST and HSW used this fact to study how a preference for
robustness inﬂuences the equity premium.
9. Concluding remarks
In delineating optimization and expectations formation, Simon and Theil’s certainty equiv-
alence principle takes for granted that the decision maker has ‘rational expectations’ about
the exogenous variables that impinge on his one-period return function. For single-agent
problems, the assumption of rational expectations was so natural for Simon and Theil
and their readers that it was received without comment or controversy. The hypothesis of
rational expectations became more technically challenging and controversial when Simon’s
co-author13 Muth (1961) applied it to forecasts about endogenous variables, like prices,
whose laws of motion were to be determined by an equilibrium shaped by a representative
agent’s decision rules. Muth’s analysis thus required a ﬁxed point argument that Simon
and Theil did not need.
Our introduction pointed out how extensively the certainty equivalence principle served
the development of applied rational expectations models. This paper has told how the
certainty equivalence principle also pertains to settings where the decision maker distrusts
13 See Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960).23
his model, unlike the decision maker inside rational expectations models. Our decision
maker’s fear of model misspeciﬁcation makes him appear to have distorted or “irrational”
expectations relative to his approximating model. The decision maker achieves robustness
by distorting his expectations. Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2002), Hansen, Sargent,
and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen and Sargent (200XXX) describe the relevant counterpart
to a rational expectations equilibrium for a context where a representative agent fears
model misspeciﬁcation.
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